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Abstract—Coverage-based greybox fuzzing (CGF) is one of the
most successful methods for automated vulnerability detection.
Given a seed file (as a sequence of bits), CGF randomly flips,
deletes or bits to generate new files. CGF iteratively constructs
(and fuzzes) a seed corpus by retaining those generated files
which enhance coverage. However, random bitflips are unlikely
to produce valid files (or valid chunks in files), for applications
processing complex file formats.
In this work, we introduce smart greybox fuzzing (SGF)
which leverages a high-level structural representation of the
seed file to generate new files. We define innovative mutation
operators that work on the virtual file structure rather than on
the bit level which allows SGF to explore completely new input
domains while maintaining file validity. We introduce a novel
validity-based power schedule that enables SGF to spend more
time generating files that are more likely to pass the parsing
stage of the program, which can expose vulnerabilities much
deeper in the processing logic.
Our evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of SGF. On
several libraries that parse structurally complex files, our tool
AFLSMART explores substantially more paths (up to 200%)
and exposes more vulnerabilities than baseline AFL. Our
tool AFLSMART has discovered 42 zero-day vulnerabilities
in widely-used, well-tested tools and libraries; so far 17 CVEs
were assigned.
1. Introduction
Coverage-based greybox fuzzing (CGF) is a popular and
effective approach for software vulnerability detection. As
opposed to blackbox approaches which suffer from a lack of
knowledge about the application, and whitebox approaches
which incur high overheads due to program analysis and
constraint solving, greybox approaches use lightweight code
instrumentation. The American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) fuzzer
[31] and its extensions [1], [2], [7], [17], [18], [21], [27]
constitute the most widely-used embodiment of CGF.
CGF technology proceeds by input space exploration via
mutation. Starting with seed inputs, it mutates them using a
pre-defined set of generic mutation operators (such as bit-
flips). Control flows exercised by the mutated inputs are then
examined to determine whether they are sufficiently “inter-
esting”. The lightweight program instrumentation helps the
fuzzer make this judgment on the novelty of the control
flows. Subsequently, the mutated inputs which are deemed
sufficiently new are submitted for further investigation, at
which point they are mutated further to explore more inputs.
The aim is to enhance greater behavioral coverage, and to
expose more vulnerabilities in a limited time budget.
One of the most significant and well-known limitations
of CGF is its lack of input structure awareness. The mutation
operators of CGF work on the bit-level representation of
the seed file. Random bits are flipped, deleted, added, or
copied from the same or from a different seed file. Yet,
many security-critical applications and libraries will pro-
cess highly structured inputs, such as image, audio, video,
database, document, or spreadsheet files. Finding vulnerabil-
ities effectively in applications processing such widely used
formats is of imminent need. Mutations of the bit-level file
representation are unlikely to effect any structural changes
on the file that are necessary to effectively explore the vast
yet sparse domain of valid program inputs. More likely than
not arbitrary bit-level mutations of a valid file will result in
an invalid file that is rejected by the program’s parser before
reaching the data processing portion of the program.
To tackle this problem, two main approaches have been
proposed that are based on dictionaries [30] and dynamic
taint analysis [25]. Michał Zalewski, the creator of AFL,
introduced the dictionary, a lightweight technique to inject
interesting byte sequences or tokens into the seed file during
mutation at random locations. Zalewski’s main concern [35]
was that a full support of input awareness might come at a
cost of efficiency or usability, both of which are AFL’s secret
to success. AFL benefits tremendously from a dictionary
when it needs to come up with magic numbers or chunk
identifiers to explore new paths. Rawat et al. [25] leverage
dynamic taint analysis [26] and control flow analysis to infer
the locations and the types of the input data based on which
their tool (VUZZER) knows where and how to mutate the
input effectively. However, both the dictionary and taint-
based approaches do not solve our primary problem: to
mutate the high-level structural representation of the file
rather than its bit-level representation. For instance, neither
a dictionary nor an inferred program feature help in adding
or deleting complete chunks from a file.
In contrast to CGF, smart blackbox fuzzers [15], [38]
are already input-structure aware and leverage a model of
the file format to construct new valid files from existing
valid files. For instance, Peach [38] uses an input model
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to disassemble valid files and to reassemble them to new
valid files, to delete chunks, and to modify important data
values. LangFuzz [15] leverages a context-free grammar for
JavaScript (JS) to extract code fragments from JS files and
to reassemble them to new JS files. However, awareness
of input structure alone is insufficient and the coverage-
feedback of a greybox fuzzer is urgently needed – as shown
by our experiments with Peach. In our experiments Peach
performs much worse even than AFL, our baseline greybox
fuzzer. Our detailed investigation revealed that Peach does
not reuse the generated inputs that improve coverage for
further test input generation. For instance, if Peach generated
a WAV-file with a different (interesting) number of channels,
that file could not be used to generate further WAV-files with
the newly discovered program behaviour. Without coverage-
feedback interesting files will not be retained for further
fuzzing. On the other hand, retaining all generated files
would hardly be economical.
In this paper, we introduce smart greybox fuzzing
(SGF)—which leverages a high-level structural representa-
tion of the seed file to generate new files—and investigate
the impact on fuzzer efficiency and usability. We define
innovative mutation operators that work on the virtual struc-
ture of the file rather than on the bit level. These structural
mutation operators allow SGF to explore completely new in-
put domains while maintaining the validity of the generated
files. We introduce a novel validity-based power schedule
that assigns more energy to seeds with a higher degree of
validity and enables SGF to spend more time generating
files that are more likely to pass the parsing stage of the
program to discover vulnerabilities deep in the processing
logic of the program.
We implement AFLSMART, a robust yet efficient and
easy-to-use smart greybox fuzzer based on AFL, a popular
and very successful CGF. AFLSMART integrates the input-
structure component of Peach with the coverage-feedback
component of AFL. Hence, in our evaluation we compare
against both as baseline techniques. Our evaluation demon-
strates that AFLSMART, within a given time limit of 24
hours, can double the zero-day bugs found. AFLSMART dis-
covers 33 bugs (8 CVEs assigned) while the baseline (AFL
and its extension AFLFAST [2]) can detect only 16 bugs,
in large, widely-used, and well-fuzzed open-source soft-
ware projects, such as FFmpeg, LibAV, LibPNG, Wavpack,
OpenJPEG and Binutils. AFLSMART also significantly im-
proves the path coverage up to 200% compared to the
baseline. AFLSMART also outperforms VUZZER [25] on its
benchmarks; AFLSMART discovers seven (7) bugs which
VUZZER could not find in another set of popular open-
source programs, such as tcpdump, tcptrace and gif2png.
Moreover, in a 1-week bug hunting campaign for FFmpeg,
AFLSMART discovers nine (9) more zero-day bugs (9 CVEs
assigned). Its effectiveness comes with negligible overhead
– with our optimization of deferred cracking AFLSMART
achieves execution speeds which are similar to AFL.
In our experience with AFLSMART, the time spent
writing a file format specification is outweighed by the
tremendous improvement in behavioral coverage and the
number of bugs exposed. One of us spent five working days
to develop 10 file format specifications (as Peach Pits [38])
which were used to fuzz all 16 subject programs. Hence,
once developed, file format specifications can be reused
across programs as well as for different versions of the same
program.
In summary, the main contribution of our work is to
make greybox fuzzing input format-aware. Given an input
format specification (e.g., a Peach Pit [38]), our smart
greybox fuzzer derives a structural representation of the seed
file, called virtual structure, and leverages our novel smart
mutation operators to modify the virtual file structure in
addition to the file’s bit sequence during the generation of
new input files. We propose smart mutation operators, which
are likely to preserve the satisfaction w.r.t. a file format
specification. During the greybox fuzzing search, our tool
AFLSMART measures the degree of validity of the inputs
produced with respect to the file format specification. It
prioritizes valid inputs over invalid ones, by enabling the
fuzzer to explore more mutations of a valid file as opposed
to an invalid one. As a result, our smart fuzzer largely
explores the restricted space of inputs which are valid as
per the file format specification, and attempts to locate
vulnerabilities in the file processing logic by running inputs
in this restricted space. We conduct extensive evaluation on
well-tested subjects processing complex file formats such as
PNG and WAV. Our experiments demonstrate that the smart
mutation operators and the validity-based power schedule
introduced by us, increases the effectiveness of fuzzing both
in terms of path coverage and vulnerabilities found within a
time limit of 24 hours. These results also demonstrate that
the additional effectiveness in our smart fuzzer AFLSMART
is not achieved by sacrificing the efficiency of greybox
fuzzing and AFL.
2. Motivating Example
2.1. The WAVE File Format
Most file systems store information as a long string of
zeros and ones—a file. It is the task of the program to make
sense of this sequence of bits, i.e., to parse the file, and to
extract the relevant information. This information is often
structured in a hierarchical manner which requires the file
to contain additional structural information. The structure of
files of the same type is defined in a file format. Adherence
to the file format allows the same file to be processed by
different programs.
WAVE files (*.wav) contain audio information and can
be processed by various media players and editors. A WAVE
file consists of chunks (see Figure 1). Each chunk consists of
chunk identifier, chunk length and chunk data. Chunks are
structured in a hierarchical manner. The root chunk requires
the first four bytes of the file to spell (in unicode) RIFF
followed by four bytes specifying the total size n of the
children chunks plus four. The next four bytes must spell (in
unicode) WAVE. The remainder of a WAVE file contains the
Chunk Type Field Length Contents
RIFF
ckID 4 Chunk ID: RIFF
cksize 4 Chunk size: 4+n
WAVEID 4 WAVE id: WAVE
chunks n Chunks containing
format information and
sampled data
fmt
ckID 4 Chunk ID: fmt
cksize 4 Chunk size: 16, 18 or 40
wFormatTag 2 Format code
nChannels 2 Number of interleaved
channels
nSamplesPerSec 4 Sampling rate (blocks per
second)
. . .
Optional chunks (fact chunk, cue chunk, playlist chunk, . . . )
data
ckID 4 Chunk ID: data
cksize 4 Chunk size: n
sampled data n Samples
pad byte 0 or 1 Padding byte if n is odd
Figure 1: An excerpt of the WAVE file format (from
Ref. [34])
children chunks, the mandatory fmt chunk, several optional
chunks, and the data chunk. The data chunk itself is
subject to further structural constraints.
We can clearly see that a WAVE file embeds audio
information and meta-data in a hierarchical chunk structure.
The WAVE file format governs all WAVE files and allows
for efficient and systematic parsing of the audio information.
2.2. The Anatomy of a Vulnerability in a Popular
Audio Compression Library
In the following, we discuss a vulnerability that our
smart greybox fuzzer AFLSMART found in WavPack [40],
a popular audio compression library that is used by many
well-known media players and editors such as Winamp,
VLC Media Player, and Adobe Audition. In our experi-
ments, the same vulnerability could not be found by tra-
ditional greybox fuzzers such as AFL [31] or AFLFAST
[2].
The discovered vulnerability (CVE-2018-10536) is a
buffer overwrite in the WAVE-parser component of Wav-
Pack.To construct an exploit, a WAVE file with more than
one format chunks needs to be crafted that satisfies several
complex structural conditions. The WAVE file contains the
mandatory riff, fmt, and data chunks, plus an addi-
tional fmt chunk placed right after the first fmt chunk.
The first fmt chunk specifies IEEE 754 32-bits (single-
precision) floating point (IEEE float) as the waveform data
format (i.e., fmt.wFormatTag= 3) and passes all sanity
checks. The second fmt chunk specifies PCM as the wave-
form data format, one channel, one bit per sample, and one
block align (i.e., fmt.wFormatTag= 1, fmt.nChannels=
1, fmt.nBlockAlign=1, and fmt.wBitsPerSample=
1).
The first fmt chunk configures WavPack to read the data
in IEEE float format, which requires certain constraints to
be satisfied, e.g., on the number of bits per sample (Lines
1 else if (!strncmp (chunk_header.ckID, "fmt ", 4)){
2 DoReadFile (infile, &WaveHeader, ...)
3 format = WaveHeader.FormatTag;
4 config->bits_per_sample = WaveHeader.BitsPerSample;
5 // Sanity checks
6 if (format == 3 && config->bits_per_sample != 32)
7 supported = FALSE;
8 if (WaveHeader.BlockAlign / WaveHeader.NumChannels
< (config->bits_per_sample + 7) / 8)
9 supported = FALSE;
10 if (!supported) exit();
11 if (format==3) config->float_norm_exp=CONFIG_FLOAT;
12 ...
Figure 2: Sketching cli/riff.c @ revision 0a72951
6–10). The second fmt chunk allows to override certain
values, e.g., the number of bits per sample, while maintain-
ing the IEEE float format configuration. More specifically,
the fmt-handling code is shown in Figure 2. The first fmt
chunk is parsed as format 3 (IEEE float), 32 bits per sample,
1 channel, and 4 block align (Lines 2–4). The configuration
passes all sanity checks for an IEEE float format (Lines 6–
10), and sets the global configuration accordingly (Line 11).
The second fmt chunk is parsed as format 1 (PCM), 1
bits per sample, 1 channel, and 1 block align (Lines 2–
4). The new configuration would be valid if WavPack had
not maintained IEEE float as the waveform data and had
reset float_norm_exp. However, it does maintain IEEE
float and thus allows an invalid configuration that would
otherwise not pass the sanity checks which finally leads to
a buffer overwrite that can be controlled by the attacker.
The vulnerability was patched by aborting when the
*.wav file contains more than one fmt chunk. A sim-
ilar vulnerability (CVE-2018-10537) was discovered and
patched for *.w64 (WAVE64) files.
2.3. Difficulties of Traditional Greybox Fuzzing
Algorithm 1 Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing
Input: Seed Corpus S
1: repeat
2: s = CHOOSENEXT(S) // Search Strategy
3: p = ASSIGNENERGY(s) // Power Schedule
4: for i from 1 to p do
5: s′ = MUTATE INPUT(s)
6: if s′ crashes then
7: add s′ to S7
8: else if ISINTERESTING(s′) then
9: add s′ to S
10: end if
11: end for
12: until timeout reached or abort-signal
Output: Crashing Inputs S7
We use these vulnerabilities to illustrate the shortcom-
ings of traditional greybox fuzzing. Algorithm 1, which is
extracted from [2], shows the general greybox fuzzing loop.
The fuzzer is provided with a initial set of program inputs,
called seed corpus. In our example, this could be a set of
WAVE files that we know to be valid. The greybox fuzzer
mutates these seed inputs in a continuous loop to generate
new inputs. Any new input that increases the coverage is
added to the seed corpus. A well-known and very success-
ful coverage-based greybox fuzzer is American Fuzzy Lop
(AFL) [31].
Guidance. A coverage-based greybox fuzzer is guided
by a search strategy and a power schedule. The search strat-
egy decides the order in which seeds are chosen from the
seed corpus, and is implemented in CHOOSENEXT (Line 2).
The power schedule decides a seed’s energy, i.e., how many
inputs are generated by fuzzing the seed, and is implemented
in ASSIGNENERGY (Line 3). For instance, AFL spends more
energy fuzzing seeds that are small and execute quickly.
Bit-level mutation. Traditional greybox fuzzers are un-
aware of the input structure. In order to generate new
inputs, a seed is modified according to pre-defined mutation
operators. A mutation operator is a transformation rule. For
instance, a bit-flip operator turns a zero into a one, and
vice versa. Given a seed input, a mutation site is randomly
chosen in the seed input and a mutation operator applied
to generate a new test input. In Algorithm 1, the method
MUTATE INPUT implements the input generation by seed
mutation. These mutation operators are specified on the bit-
level. For instance, AFL has several deletion operators, all
of which delete a contiguous, fixed-length sequence of bits
in the seed file. AFL also has several addition operators,
for instance to add a sequence of only zero’s or one’s, a
random sequence of bits, or to copy a sequence of bits
within the file. For our motivating example, Figure 3 shows
the first 72 bytes of a canonical WAVE file. To expose CVE-
2018-10536, a second valid fmt chunk must be added in-
between the existing fmt and data chunks. Clearly, it is
extremely unlikely for AFL to apply a sequence of bit-level
mutation operators to the file that result in the insertion of
such additional, valid chunks.
Dictionary. To better facilitate the fuzzing of structured
files, many greybox fuzzers, including AFL, allow to specify
a list of interesting byte sequences, called dictionary. In our
motivating example, such byte sequences could be words,
such as RIFF, fmt, and data in unicode, or common
values, such as 22050 and 88200 in hexadecimal. However,
a dictionary will not contribute much to the complex task of
constructing a valid chunk that is inserted right at the joint
boundary of two other chunks.
3. Smart Greybox Fuzzing
Smart greybox fuzzing (SGF) is more effective than
both, smart blackbox fuzzing and traditional greybox
fuzzing. Unlike traditional greybox fuzzing, SGF allows to
penetrate deeply into a program that takes highly-structured
inputs without getting stuck in the program’s parser code.
Stored Bits Information Description
52 49 46 46 R I F F RIFF.ckID
24 08 00 00 2084 RIFF.cksize
57 41 56 45 W A V E RIFF.WAVEID
66 6d 74 20 f m t fmt.ckID
10 00 00 00 16 fmt.cksize
01 00 02 00 1 2 fmt.wFormatTag (1=PCM) &
fmt.nChannels
22 56 00 00 22050 fmt.nSamplesPerSec
88 58 01 00 88200 fmt.nAvgBytesPerSec
04 00 10 00 4 16 fmt.nBlockAlign &
fmt.wBitsPerSample
64 61 74 61 d a t a data.ckID
00 08 00 00 2048 data.cksize
00 00 00 00 sound data 1 left and right channel
24 17 1e f3 sound data 2 left and right channel
3c 13 3c 14 sound data 3 left and right channel
16 f9 18 f9 sound data 4 left and right channel
34 e7 23 a6 sound data 5 left and right channel
3c f2 24 f2 sound data 6 left and right channel
11 ce 1a 0d sound data 7 left and right channel
. . .
Figure 3: Canonical WAVE file (from Ref. [34])
Unlike smart blackbox fuzzing, SGF leverages coverage-
information to explore the program’s behavior more effi-
ciently.
3.1. Virtual Structure
The effectiveness of SGF comes from the careful design
of its smart mutation operators. First, these operators should
fully leverage the structural information extracted from the
seed inputs to apply higher-order manipulations at both the
chunk level and the bit level. Second, they should be unified
operators to support all chunk-based file formats (e.g., MP3,
ELF, PNG, JPEG, WAV, AVI, PCAP). Last but not the least,
all these operators must be lightweight so that we can retain
the efficiency of greybox fuzzing.
Figure 4: Virtual structure used by AFLSMART
To implement these three design principles, we intro-
duce a new lightweight yet generic data structure namely
virtual structure which can facilitate the structural mutation
operators. Each input file can be represented as a (parse)
tree. The nodes of this tree are called chunks or attributes,
with the chunks being the internal nodes of the tree and the
attributes being the leaf nodes of the tree.
A chunk is a contiguous sequence of bytes in the file.
There is a root chunk spanning the entire file. As visualized
in Fig. 4, each chunk has a start- and an end-index repre-
senting the start and end of the byte sequence in the file,
and a type representing the distinction to other chunks (e.g.,
an fmt chunk is different from a data chunk in the WAVE
file format). Each chunk can have zero or more chunks as
children and zero or more attributes. An attribute represents
important data in the file that is not structurally relevant, for
instance wFormatTag in the fmt chunk of a WAVE file. 
<DataModel name="Chunk">
<String name="ckID" length="4"/>
<Number name="cksize" size="32" >
<Relation type="size" of="Data"/>
</Number>
<Blob name="Data"/>
<Padding alignment="16"/>
</DataModel>
<DataModel name="ChunkFmt" ref="Chunk">
<String name="ckID" value="fmt "/>
<Block name="Data">
<Number name="wFormatTag" size="16"/>
<Number name="nChannels" size="16"/>
<Number name="nSampleRate" size="32"/>
<Number name="nAvgBytesPerSec" size="32"/>
<Number name="nBlockAlign" size="16" />
<Number name="nBitsPerSample" size="16"/>
</Block>
</DataModel>
...
<DataModel name="Wav" ref="Chunk">
<String name="ckID" value="RIFF"/>
<String name="WAVE" value="WAVE"/>
<Choice name="Chunks" maxOccurs="30000">
<Block name="FmtChunk" ref="ChunkFmt"/>
...
<Block name="DataChunk" ref="ChunkData"/>
</Choice>
</DataModel> 
Listing 1: WAVE Peach Pit File Format Specification
As an example, the canonical WAVE file in Fig-
ure 3 has the following virtual structure. The root chunk
has start and end index {0, 2083}. The root chunk
(riff) has three attributes, namely ckID, cksize,
and WAVEID, and two children with indices {12, 35}
and {36, 2083}, respectively. The first child fmt has
eight attributes namely ckID, cksize, wFormatTag,
nChannels, nSamplesPerSec, nAvgBytesPerSec,
nBlockAlign, and wBitsPerSample.
To construct the virtual structure, a file format specifi-
cation and a parser is required. Given the specification and
the file, the parser constructs the virtual structure. For ex-
ample, Peach [38] has a robust parser component called File
Cracker. Given an input file and the file format specification,
called Peach Pit, our extension of the File Cracker precisely
parses and decomposes the file into chunks and attributes
and provides the boundary indices and type information.
Listing 1 shows a snippet of the Peach Pit for the WAV
file format. In this specification, we can specify the order,
type, and structure of chunks and attributes in a valid WAV
file. In Section 4 we explain how this specification can be
constructed.
3.2. Smart Mutation Operators
Based on this virtual input structure, we define three
generic structural mutation operators – smart deletion, smart
addition and smart splicing.
c
c.start c.end
Seed s
New
Seed
Smart Deletion. Given a seed file s, choose an arbitrary
chunk c and delete it. The SGF copies the bytes following
the end-index of the chosen chunk c to the start-index of
c, revises the indices of all affected chunks accordingly.
For instance, to delete the fmt-chunk in our canonical
WAVE file, the stored bits in the index range [36, 2083] are
memcpy’d to index 12. The indices in the virtual structure
of the new WAVE file are revised. For instance, the riff-
chunk’s end index is revised to 2048.
c
c .start1 c .end1
1
Seed s1
c
c .start2 c .end2
2
Seed s2
c1 c2
New
Seed
Smart Addition. Given a seed file s1, choose an arbi-
trary second seed file s2, choose an arbitrary chunk c2 in
s2, and add it after an arbitrary existing chunk c1 in s1 that
has a parent of the same type as c2 (i.e., c1.parent.type ==
c2.parent.type). The SGF copies the bytes following the end-
index of c1 to a new index where the length of the new
chunk c2 is added to the current end-index of the c1 in the
given seed file s1. Then, the SGF copies the bytes between
start- and end-index of c2 in the second seed file s2 to the
end-index of the existing chunk c1 in the given seed file
s1. Finally, all affected indices are revised in the virtual
structure representing the generated input.
c
c .start1 c .end1
1
Seed s1
c
c .start2 c .end2
2
Seed s2
New
Seed c2
Smart Splicing. Given a seed file s1, choose an arbitrary
chunk c1 in s1, choose an arbitrary second seed file s2,
choose an arbitrary chunk c2 in s2 such that c1 and c2 have
the same type, and substitute c1 with c2. The SGF copies the
bytes following the end-index of c1 to a new index where
the length of the new chunk c2 is added to the current end-
index of the c1 in the given seed file s1. Then, the SGF
copies the bytes between start- and end-index of c2 in the
second seed file s2 to the end-index of the existing chunk
c1 in the given seed file s1. Finally, all affected indices are
revised in the virtual structure representing the generated
input.
Maintaining validity. The files generated by applying
structural mutation operators have a higher degree of validity
than files generated by applying bit-level mutation operators.
The specification of immutable attributes allows the smart
greybox fuzzer to apply bit-level mutation operators only
to indices of mutable attributes (which are not structurally
relevant), increasing the likelihood to generate valid files.
However, there is no guarantee that our structural mutation
operators maintain the validity of a file. For instance, in
our motivating example the Peach Pit format specification
may allow to add or delete fmt chunks while strictly
speaking the formal WAVE format specification allows only
exactly one fmt chunk. Nevertheless, it was our relaxed
specification which allowed finding the vulnerability in the
first place (it requires two fmt chunks to be present). In
summary, strict validity is not always desirable while a high
degree of validity is necessary to reach beyond the parser
code. This is a critical advantage of our lightweight virtual
structure design.
3.3. Smart Mutation
During smart mutation, new inputs are generated by
applying structural as well as simple mutation operators to
the chosen seed file (cf. MUTATE INPUT in Alg. 1). In the
following, we discuss the challenges and opportunities of
smart mutation.
3.3.1. Stacking Mutations. To generate interesting test in-
puts, it might be worthwhile to apply several structural (high
level) and bit-level (low level) mutation operators together.
In mutation-based fuzzing, this is called stacking. Bit-level
mutation operators can easily be stacked in arbitrary order,
knowing only the start- and end-index of the file. When data
of length x is deleted, we subtract x from the end-index.
When new data of length x is added, we add x to the new
file’s end-index.
However, it is not trivial to stack structural mutation op-
erators. For each structural mutation, both the file itself and
the virtual structure representing the file must be updated
consistently. For instance, the deletion of a chunk will affect
the end-indices of all its parent chunks, and the indices of
every chunk “to the right” of the deleted chunk (i.e., chunks
with a start-index that is greater than the deleted chunk’s
end-index). Our implementation AFLSMART makes a copy
of the seed’s virtual structure and stacks mutation operators
by applying them consistently to both, the virtual structure
and the file itself. This allows us to stack structural (high-
level) mutation operators. Furthermore, if a bit-level (low-
level) mutation operation cannot be translated into a muta-
tion of the input structure, e.g., because bytes are deleted
over chunk-boundaries, the mutation is not applied.
3.3.2. Deferred Parsing. In our experiments, we observed
that constructing the virtual structure for a seed input incurs
substantial costs. The appeal of coverage-based greybox
fuzzing (CGF) and the source of its success is its efficiency
[2]. Generating and executing an input is in the order of
a few milliseconds. However, we observed that parsing an
input takes generally in the order of seconds. For instance,
the construction of the virtual structure for a 218-byte PNG
file takes between two and three seconds. If SGF constructs
the virtual structure for every seed input that is discovered,
SGF may quickly fall behind traditional greybox fuzzing
despite all of its ”smartness”.
To overcome this scalability challenge, we developed
a scheme that we call deferred parsing, which contributed
substantially to the scalability of our tool AFLSMART. We
construct the virtual structure of a seed input with a certain
probability p that depends on the current time to discover a
new path. Let t be the time since the last discovery of a new
path. Let s be the current seed chosen by CHOOSENEXT in
Line 2 of greybox fuzzing Algorithm 1 and assume that the
virtual structure for s has not been constructed, yet. Given
a threshold , we compute the probability probvirtual(s) to
construct the virtual structure of s as
probvirtual(s) = min
(
t

, 1
)
In other words, the probability probvirtual(s) to construct
the virtual structure for the seed s increases as the time
t since the last discovery increases. Once t ≥ , we have
probvirtual(s) = 100%.
Our deferred parsing optimization is inspired by the
following intuition. Without input aware greybox fuzzing
as in AFLSMART, AFL may generate many invalid inputs
which repeatedly traverse a few short paths in an application
(typically program paths which lead to rejection of the input
due to certain parse error). If more of such invalid inputs
are generated, the value of t, the time since last discovery
of a new path, is slated to increase. Once t increases beyond
a threshold , we allow AFLSMART to construct the virtual
structure. If however, normal AFL is managing to generate
inputs which still traverse new paths, t will remain small,
and we will not incur the overhead of creating a virtual
structure. The deferred parsing optimization thus allows
AFLSMART to achieve input format-awareness without sac-
rificing the efficiency of AFL.
3.4. Validity-based Power Schedule
A power schedule determines how much energy is
assigned to a given seed during coverage-based greybox
fuzzing [2]. The energy for a seed determines how much
time is spent fuzzing that seed when it is chosen next
(cf. ASSIGNENERGY in Alg. 1). In the literature, several
power schedules have been introduced. The original power
schedule of AFL [31] assigns more energy to smaller seeds
with a lower execution time that have been discovered later.
The gradient descent-based power schedule of AFLFAST
[2] assigns more energy to seeds exercising low-frequency
paths.
In the following, we define a simple validity-based
power schedule. Conventionally, validity is considered as a
boolean variable: Either a seed is valid, or it is not. However,
we suggest to consider validity as a ratio: A file can be
valid to a certain degree. The degree of validity v(s) of a
seed s is determined by the parser that constructs the virtual
structure. If all of the file can be parsed successfully, the
degree of validity v(s) = 100%. If only 65% of s can be
parsed successfully, its validity v(s) = 65%. The virtual
structure for a file that is partially valid is also only partially
constructed. To this partial structure, one chunk is added that
spans the unparsable remainder of the file.
Given the seed s, the validity-based power schedule
pv(s) assigns energy as follows
pv(s) =

2p(s) if v(s) ≥ 50% and p(s) ≤ U2
p(s) if v(s) < 50%
U otherwise
(1)
where p(s) is the energy assigned to s by the traditional
greybox fuzzer’s (specifically AFL’s) original power sched-
ule and U is a maximum energy that can be assigned by
AFL. This power schedule implements a hill climbing meta-
heuristic that always assigns twice the energy to a seed that
is at least 50% valid and has an original energy p(s) that is
at most half the maximum energy U .
The validity-based power schedule assigns more energy
to seeds with a higher degree of validity. First, the utility of
the structural mutation operators increases with the degree
of validity. Secondly, the hope is that more valid inputs can
be generated from already valid inputs. The validity-based
power schedule implements a hill climbing meta-heuristic
where the search follows a gradient descent. A seed with
a higher degree of validity will always be assigned higher
energy than a seed with a lower degree of validity.
4. File Format Specification
The quality of file format specifications is crucial to the
effectiveness and efficiency of smart greybox fuzzing. How-
ever, manually constructing such high-quality specifications
of highly-structured and complicated file formats is normally
criticized as a time-consuming and error-prone task. In this
work, we have done an extensive research on many popular
file formats (e.g., document, video, audio, image, executable
and network packet files) and found the key insights based
on which users can write specifications in a systematic way.
These key insights explain the common structures of file
formats. On the other hand, they also show the correlations
between the completeness & preciseness of data models and
the success of smart greybox fuzzing.
4.1. Insight-1. Chunk inheritance
Most file formats are composed of data chunks which
normally share a common structure. Like an abstract class
in Java and other object-oriented programming languagues
(e.g., C++ and C#), to write an input specification we start
by modelling a generic chunk containing attributes that are
shared across all chunks in the file format. Then, we model
the concrete chunks which inherit the attributes from the
generic chunk. Hence, we only need to insert/modify chunk-
specific attributes. 
<DataModel name="Chunk">
<String name="ckID" length="4" padCharacter=" "/>
<Number name="cksize" size="32">
<Relation type="size" of="Data"/>
</Number>
<Blob name="Data"/>
<Padding alignment="16"/>
</DataModel> 
Listing 2: Generic Chunk Model 
<DataModel name="ChunkFmt" ref="Chunk">
<String name="ckID" value="fmt " token="true"
/>
<Block name="Data">
<Number name="wFormatTag" size="16"/>
<Number name="nChannels" size="16"/>
<Number name="nSampleRate" size="32"/>
<Number name="nAvgBytesPerSec" size="32"/>
<Number name="nBlockAlign" size="16" />
<Number name="nBitsPerSample" size="16"/>
</Block>
</DataModel> 
Listing 3: Format Chunk Model
Listing 2 and Listing 3 show an example of how the
chunk inheritance can be applied to the input specification
of the WAVE audio file format. The generic chunk model in
Listing 2 specifies that each chunk has its chunk identifier,
chunk size and chunk data in which the chunk size con-
straints the actual length of the chunk data. Moreover, each
chunk could have padded bytes at the end to make it word (2
bytes) aligned. Listing 3 shows the model of a format chunk,
a specific data chunk in WAVE file, which inherits the chunk
size and padding attributes from the generic chunk. It only
models chunk-specific attributes like its string identifier and
what are stored inside its data.
People normally have a big concern that they need to
spend lots of time reading the standard specification of a file
format (which can be hundreds of pages long) to understand
this high-level hierarchical chunks structure. However, we
find that there exist Hex editor tools like 010Editor [28]
which can detect the file format and quickly decompose
a sample input file into chunks with all attributes. The tool
currently supports 114 most common file formats (e.g., PDF,
MPEG4, AVI, ZIP, JPEG) [29].
Figure 5 is a screenshot of 010Editor displaying a WAVE
file. The top part of the screen shows the raw data in
both Hexadecimal and ASCII modes. The bottom part is
the decomposed components including chunks’ headers, and
chunks’ data.
4.2. Insight-2. Specification completeness
As explained in Section 3, smart greybox fuzzing sup-
ports structural mutation operators that work at chunk level.
So we are not required to specify all attributes inside a
chunk. We can start with a coarse-grained specification
Figure 5: Analyzing file structure using 010Editor
and gradually make it more complete. Listing 4 shows a
simplified definition of the format chunk in which we only
specify the chunk identifier and we do not define what
are the children attributtes in its data. The chunk data is
considered as a “blob” which can contain anything as long
as its size is consistent with the chunk size. 
<DataModel name="ChunkFmt" ref="Chunk">
<String name="ckID" value="fmt " token="true"
/>
</DataModel> 
Listing 4: Simplified Format Chunk Model
Based on the this key insight and the Insight-1, one can
quickly write a short yet precise file format specification.
As shown in Section 5, the specification for the WAVE file
format can be written in 82 lines while the specification for
the PCAP network traffic file format can be written in just 24
lines. These two specifications helped smart greybox fuzzing
discover many vulnerabilities which could not be found by
other baseline techniques.
4.3. Insight-3. Relaxed constraints
There could be many constraints in a chunk (e.g., the
chunk identifier must be a constant string, the chunk size
attribute must match with the actual size or chunks must
be in order). However, since the main goal of fuzzing or
stress testing in general is to explore corner cases, we should
relax some constraints as long as these relaxed constraints do
not prevent the parser from decomposing the file. Listing 5
shows the definition of a WAVE file format. As we use
the Choice element1 to specify the list of potential chunks
(including both mandatory and optional ones), many con-
straints have been relaxed. Firstly, the chunks can appear
in any order. Secondly, some chunk (including mandatory
chunk) can be absent. Thirdly, some unknown chunk can
1. In a Peach pit, Choice elements are used to indicate any of the sub-
elements are valid but only one should be selected at a time. Reference:
http://community.peachfuzzer.com/v3/Choice.html
appear. Lastly, some chunk can appear more than once. In
fact, becaused this relaxed model, vulnerabilities like the
one in our motivating example in our paper (Section 2) can
be exposed. 
<DataModel name="Wav">
<String name="ckID" value="RIFF" token="true"/>
<Number name="cksize" size="32" />
<String name="WAVE" value="WAVE" token="true"/>
<Choice name="Chunks" maxOccurs="30000">
<Block name="FmtChunk" ref="ChunkFmt"/>
<Block name="DataChunk" ref="ChunkData"/>
<Block name="FactChunk" ref="ChunkFact"/>
<Block name="SintChunk" ref="ChunkSint"/>
<Block name="WavlChunk" ref="ChunkWavl"/>
<Block name="CueChunk" ref="ChunkCue"/>
<Block name="PlstChunk" ref="ChunkPlst"/>
<Block name="LtxtChunk" ref="ChunkLtxt"/>
<Block name="SmplChunk" ref="ChunkSmpl"/>
<Block name="InstChunk" ref="ChunkInst"/>
<Block name="OtherChunk" ref="Chunk"/>
</Choice>
</DataModel> 
Listing 5: WAVE File Format Specification
4.4. Insight-4. Reusability
Unlike specifications of program behaviours which are
program specific and hardly reusable, a file format specifi-
cation can be used to fuzz all programs taking the same file
format. We believe the benefit of finding new vulnerabilities
far outweighs the cost of writing input specifications. In
Section 5 and Section 6, we show that our smart greybox
fuzzing tool have used specifications of 10 popular file
formats (PDF, AVI, MP3, WAV, JPEG, JPEG2000, PNG,
GIF, PCAP, ELF) to discover more than 40 vulnerabilities in
heavily-fuzzed real-world software packages. Notably, based
on the key insights we have presented, it took one of us only
five (5) working days to complete these 10 specifications.
5. Experimental Setup
To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of smart
greybox fuzzing, we conducted several experiments. We im-
plemented our technique by extending the existing greybox
fuzzer AFL and call our smart greybox fuzzer AFLSMART.
To investigate whether input-structure-awareness indeed im-
proves the vulnerability finding capability of a greybox
fuzzer, we compare AFLSMART with two traditional grey-
box fuzzers AFL [31] and AFLFAST [2]. To investigate
whether smart blackbox fuzzer (given the same input model)
could achieve a similar vulnerability finding capability, we
compare AFLSMART with the smart blackbox fuzzer Peach
[38]. We also compare AFLSMART with VUZZER [25]. The
objective of VUZZER is similar to AFLSMART, it seeks to
tackle the challenges of structured file formats for greybox
fuzzing, yet without input specifications, using taint analysis
and control flow analysis.
5.1. Research Questions
RQ-1. Is smart greybox fuzzing more effective and efficient
than traditional greybox fuzzing? Specifically, we in-
vestigate whether AFLSMART exposes more unique
crashes than AFL/AFLFAST in 24 hours, and in the
absence of crashes whether AFLSMART explores
more paths than AFL/AFLFAST in the given time
budget.
RQ-2. Is smart greybox fuzzing more effective and efficient
than smart blackbox fuzzing? Specifically, we in-
vestigate whether AFLSMART exposes more unique
crashes than Peach in 24 hours, and in the absence
of crashes whether AFLSMART explores more paths
than Peach in the given time budget.
RQ-3. Is smart greybox fuzzing more effective than taint
analysis-based greybox fuzzing? Specifically, we in-
vestigate the number of bugs found by each tech-
nique individually and all together.
5.2. Implementation: AFLSMART
AFLSMART extends AFL by adding and modifying
four components, the File Cracker, the Structure Collector,
the Energy Calculator and the Fuzzer itself. The overall
architecture is shown in Figure 6. While currently integrated
with Peach, we designed AFLSMART such that it provides a
general framework that allows integrating other input parsers
and to define further structural mutation operators.
seed
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File 
Cracker
root
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Figure 6: Architecture of AFLSMART
AFLSMART File Cracker parses an input file and
decomposes it into data chunks and data attributes. It also
calculates the validity of the input file based on how much
of the file can be parsed. In this prototype, we implement
the File Cracker by modifying the Cracker component of
the smart blackbox fuzzer Peach (Community version) [38]
which fully supports highly-structured file formats such as
PNG, JPEG, GIF, MP3, WAV and AVI.
AFLSMART Structure Collector connects the core
AFLSMART Fuzzer and the File Cracker component. When
the Fuzzer requests structure information of the current input
to support its operations (e.g., smart mutations), it passes the
input to the Structure Collector for collecting the validity
and the decomposed chunks and attributes. This component
provides a generic interface to support all File Crackers –
our current Peach-based File Cracker and new ones. It is also
worth noting that AFLSMART Fuzzer only collects these
information once and saves them for future uses.
AFLSMART Energy Calculator implements the
validity-based power schedule as discussed in Section 3.
Hence, AFLSMART assigns more energy to inputs which
are more syntactically valid. Specifically, we apply a new
formula to the calculate score function of AFLSMART.
AFLSMART Fuzzer contains the most critical changes
to make AFLSMART effective. In this component, we de-
sign and implement the virtual structure which can represent
input formats in a hierarchical structure. Based on this core
data structure, all AFLSMART mutation operations which
work at chunk levels are implemented. We also modify
the fuzz one function of AFL to support our important
optimizations – deferred parsing and stacking mutations
(Section 3).
Note that our changes do not impact the instrumentation
component of AFL. As a result, we can use AFLSMART to
fuzz program binaries provided the binary is instrumented
using a tool like DynamoRio [4] and the instrumented code
can be processed by AFL. Such a binary fuzzing approach
has been achieved in the WinAFL tool2 for Windows bi-
naries. AFLSMART works well with such binary fuzzing
tools.
5.3. Subject Programs
We did a rigorous search for suitable benchmarks to
test AFLSMART and the chosen baselines. We evaluated the
techniques using both large real-world software packages
and a benchmark previously used in VUZZER paper. We
did not use the popular LAVA benchmarks [10] because
the LAVA-M subjects (uniq, base64, md5sum, who) do not
process structured files while the small file utility in LAVA-
1 takes any file, regardless of its file format, and determines
the file type.
In the comparison with AFL, AFLFAST and Peach
(RQ-1 and RQ-2), we selected the newest versions (at
the time of our experiments) of 11 experimental subjects
from well-known open source programs which take ten (6)
highly-structured file formats – executable binary file (ELF),
image files (PNG, JPEG, JP2 (JPEG2000)), audio/video
files (WAV, AVI). All of them have been well tested for
many years. Notably, five (5) media processing libraries
(FFmpeg3, LibPNG4, LibJpeg-Turbo5, ImageMagick6, and
OpenJPEG7) have joined the Google OSS-Fuzz project8 and
they are continuously tested using the state-of-the-art fuzzers
including AFL and LibFuzzer. LibAV9, WavPack 10 and
Libjasper11 are widely-used libraries and tools for image,
audio and video files processing and streaming. Binutils12
2. https://github.com/ivanfratric/winafl
3. https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg
4. https://github.com/glennrp/libpng
5. https://github.com/libjpeg-turbo
6. https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick
7. https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg
8. https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz
9. https://github.com/libav/libav
10. https://github.com/dbry/WavPack
11. https://github.com/mdadams/jasper
12. https://www.gnu.org/software/binutils/
TABLE 1: Subject Programs and File Formats. VUZZER subjects are at the bottom.
Program Description Size (LOC) Test driver Format Option
Binutils Binary analysis utilities 3700 K readelf ELF -agteSdcWw --dyn-syms -D @@
Binutils Binary analysis utilities 3700 K nm-new ELF -a -C -l --synthetic @@
LibPNG Image processing 111 K pngimage PNG @@
ImageMagick Image processing 385 K magick PNG @@ /dev/null
LibJPEG-turbo Image processing 87 K djpeg JPEG @@
LibJasper Image processing 33 K imginfo JPEG -f @@
FFmpeg Video/Audio/Image processing 1100 K ffmpeg AVI -y -i @@ -c:v mpeg4 -c:a out.mp4
LibAV Video/Audio/Image processing 670 K avconv AVI -y -i @@ -f null -
LibAV Video/Audio/Image processing 670 K avconv WAV -y -i @@ -f null -
WavPack Lossless Wave file compressor 47 K wavpack WAV -y @@ -o out_dir
OpenJPEG Image processing 115 K decompress JP2 -y @@ -o out_dir
LibJasper Image processing 33 K jasper JP2 -y @@ -o out_dir
mpg321 Command line MP3 player 5 K mpg321 MP3 --stdout @@
gif2png+libpng Image converter 36 K gif2png GIF @@
pdf2svg+libpoppler PDF to SVG converter 92 K pdf2svg PDF @@ out.svg
tcpdump+libpcap Network traffic analysis 102 K tcpdump PCAP -nr @@
tcptrace+libpcap TCP connection analysis 55 K tcptrace PCAP @@
djpeg+libjpeg Image processing 37 K djpeg JPEG @@
is a set of utilities for analyzing binary executable files. It
is installed on almost all Linux-based machines.
To compare with VUZZER (RQ-3), we chose the same
benchmark used in the paper. The benchmark includes old
versions of six (6) popular programs on Ubuntu 14.04 32-bit:
mpg321 (v0.3.2), gif2png (v2.5.8), pdf2svg (v0.2.2), tcp-
dump (v4.5.1), tcptrace (v6.6.7), and djpeg (v1.3.0). These
subjects take MP3, GIF, PDF, PCAP and JPEG files as
inputs. It is worth noting that VUZZER has not supported
64-bit environment yet.
Table 1 shows the full list of programs and their in-
formation. Note that the sizes of subject programs are
calculated by sloccount.13. Moreover, to increase the
reproducibility of our experiments, we also provide the exact
command options we used to run the subject programs. In
the experiments to answer RQ-1 and RQ-2, we tested two
programs for each file format to mitigate subject bias.
5.4. Corpora, Dictionaries, and Specifications
Format specification. AFLSMART leverages file format
specifications to construct the virtual structure of a file.
These specifications are developed as Peach Pits.14 In our
experiment, we used ten file format specifications (see Table
2). While the specification of the WAV format is a modifi-
cation of a free Peach sample15, we developed other Peach
pits from scratch. AFLSMART and Peach are provided with
the same file format specifications (i.e., Peach pits).
Seed corpus. In order to construct the initial seed files,
we leveraged several sources. For PNG and JPEG images,
we used the image files that are available as test files in their
respective code repositories. For ELF files, we collected
program binaries from the bin and /user/bin folders on the
host machine. For other file formats, we downloaded seed
13. https://www.dwheeler.com/sloccount/
14. http://community.peachfuzzer.com/v3/PeachPit.html
15. http://community.peachfuzzer.com/v3/TutorialFileFuzzing/
TABLE 2: File Format Specifications and Seed Corpora
File Format Specification Seed Corpus
Format Length (#Lines) Time spent #Files Avg. size
ELF 90 lines 4 hours 21 100 KB
PNG 128 lines 4 hours 51 4 KB
JPEG 92 lines 4 hours 8 5.5 KB
WAV 82 lines 1 hour 11 500 KB
AVI 124 lines 4 hours 10 430 KB
JP2 144 lines 4 hours 10 35 KB
PDF 84 lines 4 hours 10 140 KB
GIF 108 lines 4 hours 10 12 KB
PCAP 24 lines 4 hours 5 11 KB
MP3 90 lines 4 hours 10 201 KB
inputs from websites keeping sample files (WAV16, AVI17,
JP218, PCAP19, MP320, GIF21 and PDF22). Table 2 shows
the size of the input corpus we used for each file format.
All fuzzers are provided with the same initial seed corpus.
Dictionary. We developed dictionaries for four (4) file
formats (ELF, WAV, AVI, and JP2); AFL (and AFLSMART)
already provides dictionaries for PNG and JPEG image
formats. The dictionaries were written by simply crafting
the tokens (e.g., signatures, chunk types) from the same
specifications/documents based on which we developed the
Peach Pit file format specifications. Both AFLSMART and
AFL were run with dictionaries.
Reproducibility. To ensure the reproducibility of our
experiments, we will make AFLSMART open source and
provide the seed corpora, dictionaries, and Peach Pits used.
16. https://freewavesamples.com/source/roland-jv-2080
17. http://www.engr.colostate.edu/me/facil/dynamics/avis.htm
18. http://samples.ffmpeg.org/
19. https://wiki.wireshark.org/SampleCaptures
20. https://www.magnac.com/sounds.shtml
21. https://people.sc.fsu.edu/ jburkardt/data/gif/gif.html
22. https://www.pdfa.org/isartor-test-suite/
5.5. Infrastructure
Computational Resources. We have different setups for
two sets of experiments. In the first set of experiments
to compare AFLSMART with AFL, AFLFAST, and Peach
we used machines with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2660v3
processor that has 56 logical cores running at 2.4GhZ. Each
machine runs Ubuntu 16.04 (64 bit) and has access to 64GB
of main memory. All fuzzers have the same time budget (24
hours), the same computational resources, and are started
with the same seed corpus with the same dictionaries. Peach
and AFLSMART also use the same Peach Pits.
In the comparison with VUZZER, as VUZZER has not
supported 64-bit environment yet, we set up a virtual ma-
chine (VM) having the same settings reported in the paper
– a Ubuntu 14.04 LTS system equipped with a 32-bit 2-core
Intel CPU and 4 GB RAM. Both VUZZER and AFLSMART
are started with the same seed corpus.
Experiment repetition. To mitigate the impact of ran-
domness, for each subject program we run five (5) isolated
instances of each of AFL, AFLFAST, AFLSMART, and
Peach in parallel. We emphasize that none of the instances
share the same queue. Specifically, Peach does not support
the shared queue architecture (i.e., parallel fuzzing mode in
AFL23).
Measurement in AFL-based fuzzers. The greybox fuzzers
AFL, AFLFAST, and AFLSMART already provide the num-
ber of explored paths in five-second intervals in a file called
plot_data. This allows us to plot these quantities over
time. To compute the number of unique bugs found, we
used a call stack-based bucketing approach [9] to analyze
and group the discovered bugs. Crashes that have the exact
the same call stack are in the same group. We selected one
representative from each group for bug reporting purposes.
Measurement in Peach. Peach does not keep the gener-
ated test cases. It only stores bug-triggering inputs which
complicates our measurement of the number of paths ex-
plored. Hence, we modified Peach such that we could collect
all test cases which Peach generates during a 24-hour run.
Then, we use the afl-cmin24 – a corpus minimization utility
in the AFL toolset to find the smallest subset of files in
the generated test cases that still trigger the full range of
instrumentation data points. To achieve a fair comparison,
we also use the same afl-cmin to minimize the test cases
generated by AFL, AFLFAST and AFLSMART. These re-
sults are reported in the fourth column (#Min-set) of the
Table 3
6. Experimental Results
RQ.1 SGF Versus Traditional Greybox Fuzzing
In terms of discovered number of paths, AFLSMART
clearly outperforms both AFL and AFLFAST. AFLSMART
discovered more paths in ten (10) out of twelve (12) sub-
jects. In the two larger subjects, ffmpeg and avconv (taking
23. https://github.com/mirrorer/afl/blob/master/docs/parallel fuzzing.txt
24. https://github.com/mirrorer/afl/blob/master/afl-cmin
TABLE 3: Average number of paths discovered, the minimal
sets of test cases calculated by afl-cmin, crashes found, and
unique bugs discovered in 5 runs after 24 hours.
Binary Fuzzer #Paths #Min-set #Crashes #Bugs
readelf AFL 14855 6285 15 3
ELF AFLFAST 16048 6422 22 3
Peach N/A 1202 0 0
AFLSMART 16236 7002 19 3
nm-new AFL 10201 4283 33 1
ELF AFLFAST 10159 3995 45 1
Peach N/A 454 0 0
AFLSMART 8981 3885 34 2
pngimage AFL 5280 2324 0 0
PNG AFLFAST 5663 2294 0 0
Peach N/A 395 0 0
AFLSMART 6497 2560 1 1
magick AFL 6434 2696 0 0
PNG AFLFAST 6249 2668 0 0
Peach N/A 66 0 0
AFLSMART 6860 2861 0 0
djpeg AFL 3661 1275 0 0
JPEG AFLFAST 3778 1264 0 0
Peach N/A 342 0 0
AFLSMART 4005 1351 0 0
imginfo AFL 1681 967 18 2
JPEG AFLFAST 1437 759 44 2
Peach N/A 53 0 0
AFLSMART 1812 1003 58 2
ffmpeg AFL 2783 1340 0 0
AVI AFLFAST 3378 1547 0 0
Peach N/A 1413 0 0
AFLSMART 8485 3582 2 1
avconv AFL 4980 1205 213 3
AVI AFLFAST 4900 1209 218 3
Peach N/A 849 0 0
AFLSMART 13549 3328 503 3
avconv AFL 14849 4271 0 0
WAV AFLFAST 14617 4209 0 0
Peach N/A 867 0 0
AFLSMART 20616 6418 13 3
wavpack AFL 1724 425 59 1
WAV AFLFAST 1950 460 48 1
Peach N/A 339 0 0
AFLSMART 1998 537 191 5
decompress AFL 6615 1984 0 0
JPEG2000 AFLFAST 6767 2030 0 0
Peach N/A 389 0 0
AFLSMART 6503 1950 16 3
jasper AFL 2624 1049 220 6
JPEG2000 AFLFAST 2298 954 156 5
Peach N/A 215 0 0
AFLSMART 3957 1582 944 10
AVI files), AFLSMART explored 200% more paths than
AFL and AFLFAST. The same improvement can be ob-
served in the minimized sets of test cases (#Min-set) as well.
AFLSMART performed a bit worse than AFL and AFLFAST
(in terms of path exploration) in a ELF-parsing subject in
Binutils (nm-new) and an OpenJPEG utility (decompress).
For these two subjects, AFLSMART achieved similar path
coverage in the first six (6) hours after which AFL and AFL-
FAST started outperforming AFLSMART (see Figure 7).
In terms of bug finding, AFLSMART discovered bugs
in 10 subjects while AFL and AFLFAST could not detect
bug in four of them (ffmpeg, pngimage, decompress and
avconv (taking WAV files)). After analyzing the crashes, we
TABLE 4: Bug reports. Assertion Failure (AF), Aborted
(AB), Divide-by-Zero (DZ), Heap/Stack Overflow (OF),
Null Pointer Reference (NP)
Subject Bug-ID Type AFL AFLFAST Peach AFLSMART
WavPack CVE-2018-10536 OF 7 7 7 3
CVE-2018-10537 OF 7 7 7 3
CVE-2018-10538 OF 7 7 7 3
CVE-2018-10539 OF 7 7 7 3
CVE-2018-10540 OF 3 3 7 3
Binutils Bugzilla-23062 AF 3 3 7 3
Bugzilla-23063 AF 3 3 7 3
CVE-2018-10372 OF 3 3 7 3
CVE-2018-10373 NP 3 3 7 3
Bugzilla-23177 OF 7 7 7 3
LibPNG CVE-2018-13785 DZ 7 7 7 3
Libjasper Issue-174 AF 3 3 7 3
Issue-175 AF 3 3 7 3
Issue-182-1 OF 7 7 7 3
Issue-182-2 NP 7 7 7 3
Issue-182-3 OF 7 7 7 3
Issue-182-4 NP 7 7 7 3
Issue-182-5 OF 3 3 7 3
Issue-182-6 AF 3 3 7 3
Issue-182-7 AF 3 3 7 3
Issue-182-8 AB 3 3 7 3
Issue-182-9 AF 3 3 7 3
Issue-182-10 AF 3 7 7 3
OpenJPEG Email-Report-1 OF 7 7 7 3
Email-Report-2 OF 7 7 7 3
Issue-1125 AF 7 7 7 3
LibAV Bugzilla-1121 OF 7 7 7 3
Bugzilla-1122 OF 7 7 7 3
Bugzilla-1123 OF 7 7 7 3
Bugzilla-1124 OF 3 3 7 3
Bugzilla-1125 DZ 3 3 7 3
Bugzilla-1127 OF 3 3 7 3
FFmpeg Email-Report-3 DZ 7 7 7 3
TOTAL 16 15 0 33
reported 33 zero-day bugs found by AFLSMART out of
which only 16 bugs were found by AFL and AFLFAST. Vice
versa, all zero-day bugs that AFL and AFLFAST found were
also found by AFLSMART. Hence, AFLSMART discovered
twice as many bugs as AFL/AFLFAST. Table 4 shows the
detailed bugs found by AFLSMART and the baseline. 17
bugs are heap & stack buffer overflows (many of them are
buffer overwrites) which are known to be easily exploitable.
The maintainers of these programs have fixed 12 bugs we
reported. The MITRE corporation25 has assigned eight (8)
CVEs to the most critical vulnerabilities.
The main reason why AFL and AFLFAST could not
find many bugs, meanwhile AFLSMART did, in subjects
like FFmpeg, LibAV, WavPack, and OpenJPEG is that these
programs take in highly structured media files (e.g., image,
audio, video) in which the data chunks must be placed
in order at correct locations. This is very challenging for
traditional greybox fuzzing tools like AFL and AFLSMART.
In addition to the motivating example (CVE-2018-10536
and CVE-2018-10537), we analyze in depth few more crit-
ical vulnerabilities found by AFLSMART to explain the
challenges.
25. https://cve.mitre.org/
CVE-2018-10538: Heap Buffer Overwrite. The buffer
overwrite is caused by two integer overflows and insufficient
memory allocation. To construct an exploit, we need to craft
a valid WAVE file that contains the mandatory riff, fmt,
and data chunks. Between the fmt and data chunk, we
add an additional unknown chunk (i.e., that is neither fmt,
data, ..) with cksize ≥ 0x80000000.
During parsing the file, WavPack enters the “unknown
chunk” handling code shown in Figure 8. It reads the
specified chunk size from the chunk_header struct and
stores it as a 32-bit signed integer. Since ckSize ≥
231, the assignment in riff.c:288 overflows, such that
bytes_to_copy contains a negative value. The memory
allocation function malloc takes only unsigned values
causing a second overflow to a smaller positive number.
When DoReadFile attempts to read more information
from the WAVE file, there is not enough memory being
allocated, resulting in a memory overwrite that can be
controlled by the attacker. This vulnerability (CVE-2018-
10538) was patched by aborting when bytes_to_copy
is negative.
OpenJPEG-1: Heap Buffer Overread & Overwrite.
The buffer overread (lines 617-619) and overwrite (lines
629-631) (see Figure 9) are caused by a missing check of
the actual size (width and height) of the three color streams
(red, green, and blue). Without this check, the code assumes
that all the three streams have the same size and it uses the
same bound value (max) to access the buffers. To construct
an exploit, we need to craft a valid JP2 (JPEG2000) file
that contains three color streams having different sizes by
“swapping” the whole stream(s) from one valid JP2 file and
place it/them in the correct position(s) in another valid JP2
file. Without the structural information, traditional greybox
fuzzing is unlikely to do such a precise swapping.
RQ.2 SGF Versus Smart Blackbox Fuzzing
Given the same input format specifications, AFLSMART
clearly outperforms Peach in all twelve (12) subjects (see
Table 3 and Table 4). AFLSMART generated up to an order
of magnitude meaningful test cases (see #Min-set column
in Table 3) and discovered 33 zero-day bugs while Peach
could not find a single vulnerability .26
Apart from the difficulty to discover zero-day bugs in
the heavily-fuzzed benchmarks, we explain these results by
the lack of coverage feedback mechanism in Peach. The
smart blackbox fuzzer treats all test cases at all stages
equally. There is no evolution of a seed corpus. Instead,
there is a simple enumeration of files that are valid w.r.t.
the provided specification. This is a well-kown limitation
of Peach. Recently Lian et. al [19] have tried to tackle
this problem by applying LLVM passes and designing a
feedback mechanism for Peach. The tool is not available
for further comparison and analysis.
26. Unlike for the AFL-based fuzzers, Peach does not produce data that
allows us to plot the number of paths discovered over time in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Number of paths discovered over time for AFL, AFLFAST, and AFLSMART
286 else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
287
288 int bytes_to_copy=(chunk_header.ckSize+1) & 1L;
289 char *buff=malloc(bytes_to_copy);
. . .
296 if (!DoReadFile(infile,buff,bytes_to_copy,..)) {
Figure 8: Showing cli/riff.c @ revision 0a72951
A second explanation is the completeness of the file
format specification. The performance of Peach substantially
depends on the precision and completeness of the file format
specification. Peach might need more detailed input models
in which (almost) all chunks and attributes are specified
with exact data types to generate more interesting files. In
contrast, AFLSMART does not require very detailed file
format specifications to derive the virtual structure of a file
and apply our structural mutation operators.
RQ.3 Versus Taint analysis-based Greybox Fuzzing
AFLSMART outperforms VUZZER on a VUZZER’s
benchmark. AFLSMART found 15 bugs in all subject pro-
grams in the benchmark in which seven (7) bugs could not
be found by VUZZER in tcpdump, tcptrace and gif2png (see
Table 5. It is worth noting that all these bugs are not zero-day
ones because the VUZZER benchmark contains old versions
of software packages on the out-dated Ubuntu 14.04 32-bit;
612 r = image->comps[0].data;
613 g = image->comps[1].data;
614 b = image->comps[2].data;
. . .
616 for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
617 *in++ = (unsigned char) * r++;
618 *in++ = (unsigned char) * g++;
619 *in++ = (unsigned char) * b++;
620 }
. . .
622 cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, ...);
. . .
624 r = image->comps[0].data;
625 g = image->comps[1].data;
626 b = image->comps[2].data;
. . .
628 for (i = 0U; i < max; ++i) {
629 *r++ = (unsigned char) * out++;
630 *g++ = (unsigned char) * out++;
631 *b++ = (unsigned char) * out++;
632 }
Figure 9: Showing common/color.c @ rev d2205ba
all the bugs have been fixed. We explain these results by the
limited information VUZZER can infer using taint analysis
– it cannot infer the high-level structural representation of
the input so it cannot do mutations at the chunk level.
We also investigate the intersection of the results. As
shown in Figure 10, VUZZER and AFLSMART discov-
TABLE 5: VUZZER vs AFLSMART on VUZZER’s bench-
mark
Application Vuzzer AFLSMART
#Crashes #Bugs #Crashes #Bugs
mpg321 337 2 193 2
gif2png+libpng 127 1 54 2
pdf2svg+libpoppler 13 3 20 2
tcpdump+libpcap 3 1 149 6
tcptrace+libpcap 403 1 240 2
djpeg+libjpeg 1 1 1 1
VUZZER — 1 8 7 — AFLSMART
Figure 10: Venn Diagram showing the number of bugs
that VUZZER and AFLSMART discover individually and
together.
ered 16 bugs all together. Even though the intersection is
large (AFLSMART discovered almost all bugs found by
VUZZER), we believe AFLSMART and VUZZER are two
potentially supplementary approaches. While AFLSMART
can leverage the input structure information to systemati-
cally do mutations at the chunk level and explore new search
space (which is unlikely to be done by bit-level mutations),
VUZZER can leverage its taint analysis to infer features of
attributes inside the newly generated inputs and mutate them
effectively.
7. Case Study. Bug Hunting using AFLSMART
We conducted an extra experiment to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of AFLSMART in a bug hunting campaign for
a large and popular software package. We chose FFmpeg
as our target program because this is an extremely popular
and heavily-fuzzed library. Every day when we use our
computers/smartphones in working time or in our leisure
time, we would use at least one software powered by the
FFmpeg library like a web browser (e.g., Google Chrome),
a sharing video page (e.g., YouTube), or a media player
(e.g., VLC). FFmpeg is heavily fuzzed; as a part of OSS-
Fuzz project, it has been continuously fuzzed for years. Due
to its popularity, any serious vulnerability in FFmpeg could
compromise millions of systems and expose critical security
risk(s).
We run five (5) instances of AFLSMART in parallel
mode27 in one week using the AVI input specification to test
its functionality of converting an AVI file to a MPEG4 file
(see Table 1 for the exact command). In this fuzzing cam-
paign, AFLSMART discovered nine (9) zero-day crashing
27. https://github.com/mirrorer/afl/blob/master/docs/parallel fuzzing.txt
TABLE 6: CVEs of bugs found in FFmpeg
Subject Bug-ID Description Severity
FFmpeg CVE-2018-13301 Null pointer dereference MEDIUM
CVE-2018-13305 Heap buffer overwrite HIGH
CVE-2018-13300 Heap buffer overread HIGH
CVE-2018-13303 Null pointer dereference MEDIUM
CVE-2018-13302 Heap buffer overwrite HIGH
CVE-2018-12459 Assertion failure MEDIUM
CVE-2018-12458 Assertion failure MEDIUM
CVE-2018-13304 Assertion failure MEDIUM
CVE-2018-12460 Null pointer dereference MEDIUM
bugs including buffer overflows, null pointer dereferences
and assertion failures. All the bugs have been fixed and nine
(9) CVE IDs have been assigned to them. Table 6 shows
the CVEs and their severity levels based on the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System version 3.0 [32]; all these nine
vulnerabilities are rated from medium to high severity.
The results confirm the practical impact of smart grey-
box fuzzing in testing programs taking highly-structured
input files like FFmpeg. It shows that the benefit of finding
new vulnerabilities outweighs the one-time effort of writing
input specifications.
8. Related Work
Smart blackbox fuzzing. The stream of works that is most
closely related to ours is that of smart blackbox fuzzers
which leverage file format specifications to generate inputs
for a program that is otherwise treated as a blackbox. In the
area of smart blackbox fuzzing, input grammars have been
used to generate test inputs [24]. There exist a variety of
tools employing this technique, such as Peach fuzzer [38],
Spike [39], Domato [33], and LangFuzz [15]. LangFuzz is
a smart blackbox fuzzer that has been used to detect crashes
in JavaScript engines; it uses a file format specification
to mutate a given seed input and replaces code fragments
with those learned from a set of parsed sample inputs. Our
work on AFLSMART can be seen as integrating the format-
awareness capability into coverage-based grey-box fuzzing.
Smart whitebox fuzzing. Another related stream of works
is that of smart whitebox fuzzing which leverages both
program structure and input structure to explore the pro-
gram most effectively. Whitebox fuzzers are often based on
symbolic execution engines such as KLEE [5], or S2E [8].
Grammar-based whitebox fuzzers [12] can generate files
that are valid w.r.t. a context-free grammar. Model-based
whitebox fuzzing [23] enforces semantic constraints over
the input structure that cannot be expressed in a context-free
grammar, such as length-of relationships. In contrast to our
approach, smart whitebox fuzzers require heavy machinery
of symbolic execution and constraint solving.
Coverage-based greybox fuzzing. Our work builds on
coverage-based greybox fuzzing (CGF) [31], [37], which is
a popular and effective approach for software vulnerability
detection. The AFL fuzzer [31] and its extensions [1], [2],
[7], [11], [17], [18], [21], [27] constitute the most widely
used embodiment of CGF. CGF is a promising middle
ground between blackbox and whitebox fuzzing. Compared
to blackbox approaches, CGF uses light-weight instrumen-
tation to guide the fuzzer to new regions of the code, and
compared to whitebox approaches, CGF does not suffer
from high overheads of constraint solving [3]. To the best of
our knowledge, ours is the first work to propose and build
an input format-aware greybox fuzzer.
Boosted greybox fuzzing. AFLFAST [2] uses Markov
chain modeling to target regions that are still not gener-
ally covered by AFL. The approach discovers known bugs
faster compared to standard AFL, as well as finding new
bugs. AFLGO [1] performs reachability analysis to a given
location or target by prioritizing seeds which are estimated
to have a lower distance to the target. Angora [7] is an ex-
tension of AFL to improve its coverage that performs search
based on gradient descent to solve path condition without
symbolic execution. SlowFuzz [22] prioritizes inputs with
a higher resource usage count for further mutation, with
the objective of discovering vulnerabilities to complexity
attacks. These works improve the effectiveness of greybox
fuzzing along other dimensions (not input format aware-
ness), and are largely orthogonal to our approach
Restricted mutations. Other works in the CGF area
employ specific optimizations to restrict the mutations.
VUzzer [25] uses data- and control-flow analysis of the test
subject to detect the locations and the type of the input
data to mutate or to keep constant. Steelix [18] focuses on
developing customized mutation operations of magic bytes,
e.g., the special words RIFF, fmt, or data in a WAVE file
(see 2). SymFuzz [6] learns the dependencies in the bits in
the seed input using symbolic execution in order to compute
an optimal mutation ratio given a program under test and
the seed input; the mutation ratio is the number of seed
bits that are flipped in mutation-based fuzzing. These works
encompass specific optimizations to restrict mutations. They
do not inject input format awareness for generating valid
inputs as is achieved by our file format aware mutation
operators, or validity-based power schedules.
Greybox fuzzing and symbolic execution. T-Fuzz [21]
removes sanity checks in the code that blocks the fuzzers
(AFL or honggfuzz [36]) from progressing further. This,
however, introduces false positives, which are then detected
using symbolic execution. Driller [27] is a combination of
fuzzing and symbolic execution to allow for deep explo-
ration of program paths. In our work, we avoid any symbolic
execution, and enhance the effectiveness of grey-box fuzzing
without sacrificing the efficiency of AFL.
Format specification inference. Several works study file
format inferencing. Lin and Zhang [20] present an approach
to derive the file’s input tree from the dynamic execution
trace. Learn&Fuzz [14] uses neural-network-based statistical
machine learning to generate files satisfying a complex for-
mat. The approach is used to fuzz Microsoft Edge browser
PDF handler, and found a bug not previously found by
previous approaches such as SAGE [13]. AUTOGRAM [16]
uses dynamic taint analysis to derive input grammars. Such
works on input format inference can potentially help input-
aware fuzzers such as AFLSMART.
9. Discussion
Greybox fuzzing has been the technology of choice for
practical, automated detection of software vulnerabilities.
The current embodiment of greybox fuzzing in the form of
the AFL fuzzer is agnostic to the input format specification.
This leads to lot of time in a fuzzing campaign being
wasted in generation of syntactically invalid inputs. In this
work, we have brought in the input format awareness of
commercial blackbox fuzzers into the domain of greybox
fuzzing. This is achieved via file format aware mutations,
validity-based power schedules, and several optimizations
(most notably the deferred parsing optimization) which al-
lows our AFLSMART tool to retain the efficiency of AFL.
Detailed evaluation of our tool AFLSMART with respect
to AFL on applications processing popular file formats
(such as AVI, MP3, WAV) demonstrate that AFLSMART
achieves substantially (up to 200%) higher path coverage
and finds more bugs as compared to AFL. The manual
effort of specifying an input format is a one-time effort,
and was limited to 4 hours for each of the input formats we
examined.
In future, we can extend the input file-format fuzzing of
AFLSMART to input protocol fuzzing by taking into account
input protocol specifications, along the lines of the state
model already supported by the Peach fuzzer. This will allow
us to extend AFLSMART for fuzzing of reactive systems.
Moreover, the recent work of Godefroid et al. [14] has
shown the promise of learning input formats automatically,
albeit for a specific format namely PDF. In future, we
plan to study this direction to further alleviate the one-time
manual effort of specifying an input format. Last but not the
least, we can use the flexible architecture of AFLSMART
(Figure 6) to support interfacing with many other input-
format-aware blackbox fuzzers, such as the Domato fuzzer
[33] which is known to work well for HTML format. This
will enhance the utility of AFLSMART for a wider variety
of file formats.
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